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CONFLICTS BETWEEN LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN PATIENT SAFETY
David D. Woods*
INTRODUCTION
Currently the mechanisms of, and beliefs about, accountability are
in a phase of transition in our society, particularly for health care.'
For example, when patients are injured as a result of care, a part of
the response calls for imposing new accountability relationships be-
tween health care professionals or care delivery organizations and the
public they serve. Ultimately one can see the whole patient safety
movement as an expression of the public's concern about how eco-
nomic pressures erode past accountability and trust relationships. The
public desires new accountability mechanisms to ensure that the pa-
tient will remain foremost relative to the other goals of health care
organizations and personnel.2
Accountability is emphasized in the debate on patient safety be-
cause the way decisionmakers are held accountable is presumed to
influence how they make decisions and the quality of those decisions.
Social links such as accountability are indeed powerful forces influenc-
ing human decisionmaking, and these relationships have been studied
in organizational dynamics, social cognition, and human-machine in-
teraction. 3 Social and cognitive scientists have shown how human
decisionmaking occurs in a context of expectations that one may be
* David D. Woods, Professor, Institute for Ergonomics, The Ohio State University. The
ideas for new directions in accountability have emerged from discussions with Lawrence Palmer
(University of Louisville), Linda Emanuel (Northwestern University), Sidney Dekker (Linkop-
ing University, Sweden), Larry Hirschhorn, Jane Carthey (National Health Service England),
Gene Rochlin (University of California, Berkeley), and Phil Tetlock (University of California,
Berkeley).
1. See generally VIRGINIA A. SHARPE & ALAN I. FADEN, MEDICAL HARM: HISTORICAL, CON-
CEPTUAL, AND ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF IATROGENIC ILLNESS (1998).
2. RICHARD I. COOK ET AL., AM. MED. ASS'N, A TALE OF Two STORIES: CONTRASTING
VIEWS ON PATIENT SAFETY (1998), http://www.npsf.org/exec/npsf-rpt.pdf.
3. See generally Anthony J. Adamski & Ron Westrum, Requisite Imagination: The Fine Art of
Anticipating What Might Go Wrong, in HANDBOOK OF COGNITIVE TASK DESIGN 193 (Erik
Hollnagel ed., 2003); Larry Hirschhorn, Hierarchy Versus Bureaucracy, in NEW CHALLENGES TO
UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONS 137 (Karlene H. Roberts ed., 1993); Jennifer S. Lerner &
Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (1999);
Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability Theory: Mixing Properties of Human Agents with Properties of
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called to give accounts for those decisions to different parties. 4 How
and to whom people expect to be called to account affects their per-
formance in implicit and explicit ways. The expectations for what are
considered adequate accounts and the consequences for people when
their accounts are judged inadequate are critical parts of a cycle of
giving accounts and being called to account. This is a reciprocating
cycle because how one may be called to account influences behavior
and how one calls others to account is influenced by beliefs about the
factors that inform human decisions. 5 Interestingly, different factors
in this reciprocating cycle can support or undermine practitioner per-
formance and learning in predictable ways.
Thus, the patient safety movement can be seen as an ongoing case
of change in this reciprocating cycle. The calls for new accountability
relationships that emerge following famous cases of patient injuries
represent beliefs by different stakeholders in health care about how
different forms of accountability will effect behavior and perform-
ance.6 However, different assumptions regarding how cycles of ac-
countability work lead to very different and conflicting plans about
how to change health care systems to improve patient safety.
This Article contrasts those common beliefs about accountability
with research based on how different mechanisms of being called to
account affect those aspects of decisionmaking most relevant to im-
proving patient safety. First, past research shows that there is a com-
plex set of factors, relationships, and effects at work in the
reciprocating cycle of the calling on, and giving of accounts. Second,
the empirical regularities and relationships are not consistent with
motivational accounts, that is, that accountability creates general im-
provements by increasing task motivation. Third, and most startling,
the research demonstrates that some factors in the reciprocating cy-
cles of accountability may degrade decisions, performance, coopera-
tion, and learning, while other relationships in the cycle may enhance
these cognitive processes. For example, under some conditions the
need to give an account for a decision to others can increase critical
thinking and attenuate commitment (presumably ways to enhance the
decision), while other conditions can increase self-justification, and
bolster an initial attitude and commitment (presumably ways that re-
duce the quality of a decision). Some forms of accountability can in-
Social Systems, in SHARED COGNITION IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE MANAGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE
117 (Leigh L. Thompson et al. eds., 1999).
4. See generally Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 3.
5. Id. at 256-57.
6. See generally COOK ET AL., supra note 2.
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crease defensive behavior, create adversarial relationships among
parties who need to cooperate, or lead people to prefer options that
are easier to justify given knowledge of the standards others impose
for giving suitable accounts.
Thus, a systems approach to patient safety also examines the recip-
rocating cycle of giving accounts and calling to account to determine
the lawful effects of different systems for accountability. The slogan
of "moving beyond a culture of blame" in the patient safety move-
ment is a call to abandon poor systems of accountability and to begin
to design a more effective reciprocating cycle, not a tolerance for an
absence of accountability. 7 This Article presents a set of conflicts be-
tween the typical beliefs about the effects of systems of accountability
and the research results that relate to building high-reliability organi-
zations, including several ways that poor systems of accountability can
degrade cognitive and cooperative work and human-computer
cooperation.
II. CONFLICTS BETWEEN ACCOUNTABILITY-AS-BLAME
AND LEARNING
The patient safety movement is based on three ideas derived from
results of research on human expertise, collaborative work, and high-
reliability organizations developed through investments by other
industries:8
(1) adopt a "systems approach" to understand how breakdowns can
occur and how to support decisions in the increasingly complex
worlds of health care;9
(2) move beyond a culture of blame to create open flow of informa-
tion and learning about vulnerabilities to failure;10 and
7. See generally SIDNEY W.A. DEKKER, TEN QUESTIONS ABOUT HUMAN ERROR: A NEW
VIEW OF HUMAN FACTORS AND SYSTEMS SAFETY (2004).
8. See generally, e.g., J. Rasmussen, Human Error and the Problem of Causality in Analysis of
Accidents, 327 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y LONDON B 449 [hereinafter Rasmussen,
Human Error]; Jens Rasmussen, The Role of Error in Organizing Behaviour, 33 ERGONOMICS
1185 (1990) [hereinafter Rasmussen, The Role of Error]. James Reason synthesizes the results
on organizational contributors in JAMES REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS OF ORGANIZATIONAL
ACCIDENTS (1997). The results on characteristics of high-reliability organizations are covered in
Gene I. Rochlin, Safe Operation as a Social Construct, 42 ERGONOMICS 1549 (1999), and in Karl
E. Weick et al., Organizing for High Reliability: Processes of Collective Mindfulness, 21 RES.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 81 (1999).
9. See generally COOK ET AL., supra note 2; D.D. Woods & R.I. Cook, Nine Steps to Move
Forward from Error, 4 COGNITION TECH. & WORK 137 (2002).
10. See generally SIDNEY DEKKER, THE FIELD GUIDE TO HUMAN ERROR INVESTIGATIONS
(2002); DEKKER, supra note 7.
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(3) build partnerships across all stakeholders in health care to set
aside differences and to make progress on a common overarch-
ing goal.'
The lessons from research point out that blame and the accompanying
threat of punishment and stigmatization activates defensive mecha-
nisms, drives out information about systemic vulnerabilities, stops
learning, and undermines the potential for improvement.1 2
As these new messages about a systems approach to safety circu-
lated and became more visible in health care, they collided with the
common belief that practitioners and managers should be "accounta-
ble" to patients and to other stakeholders. 13 For many, the systems
approach seems to erode accountability relationships or to provide
cover for individuals or organizations involved in episodes where pa-
tients are injured in the process of care. Hence, the patient safety
movement faces a basic conflict between learning or improving sys-
tems and holding individuals responsible for the consequences of their
decisions and actions.
In the common belief, accountability systems are operationalized in
terms of identification of culprits, threats of disciplinary (or even crim-
inal) proceedings, monetary losses, and threats of stigmatization. 14
Thus, calls for increased accountability take the form of imposing new
or increased consequences for practitioners and delivery organizations
after a patient is injured as a result of care. These beliefs rest on as-
sumptions that remedial and disciplinary actions will produce im-
provements by channeling or increasing the motivation and energy
devoted to patient care. To many who may bear the brunt of failure,
any argument to move beyond a culture of blame is suspected as a
disguised attempt to protect culprits.1 5
11. William R. Hendee, Forward to PROCEEDINGS OF ENHANCING PATIENT SAFETY AND RE-
DUCING ERRORS IN HEALTH CARE, Nov. 1998 [hereinafter ENHANCING PATIENT SAFETY] (pro-
ceedings of a Multidisciplinary Conference at the Annenberg Center for Health Sciences); David
Woods, Remarks at the National Summit on Medical Errors and Patient Safety Research, Wash-
ington, D.C. (Sept. 11, 2000), http://www.quic.gov/summit/wwoods.htm.
12. See generally Tetlock, supra note 3; Weick et al., supra note 8. Charles Billings covers
these issues in aviation in Charles E. Billings, The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, in
ENHANCING PATIENT SAFETY, supra note 11, at 97.
13. See generally SHARPE & FADEN, supra note 1.
14. See generally DEKKER, supra note 7; Jeffrey P. Brown, Ethical Dilemmas in Healthcare, in
ETHICS IN SAFETY: CASES FROM AVIATION, HEALTHCARE, AND OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL HEALTH (Manoj S. Patankar et al. eds., forthcoming 2005); Sidney Dekker, When
Human Error Becomes a Crime, 3 HUM. FACTORS & AEROSPACE SAFETY 83 (2003); Baruch
Fischhoff, Diagnosing Stigma, 59 RELIABILITY ENGINEERING & SYS. SAFETY 47 (1998).
15. Virginia A. Sharpe, Accountability and Justice in Patient Safety Reform, in ACCOUNTABIL-
ry: PATIENT SAFETY AND POLICY REFORM (Virginia A. Sharpe ed., 2004).
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At the root of these reactions is one model of how people contrib-
ute to success and to failure-the notion that erratic people degrade
an otherwise safe system.16 In this belief system, work on safety in-
volves methods to protect the system (managers, regulators, and con-
sumers) from unreliable people. Blame becomes part of the process
of identifying and protecting us from those other erratic people. Once
culprits are identified, we can then invoke methods of remedial train-
ing, professional disciplinary action, limits on practice, banishment, or
even criminal prosecution to improve safety.'
7
This is an intuitive, common, and powerful way to view safety, and
it is erroneous, based on research results of expert human perform-
ance, results of characteristics of high-reliability organizations, and ex-
perience from other industries.' 8 The alternative model derived from
research is that people create safety at all levels of the socio-technical
system by learning and adapting to information about how all partici-
pants can contribute to failure. 19 Progress comes from helping people
create safety in the face of systemic vulnerabilities. Startlingly, this is
what the science says-help people, at all levels of organizations and
institutions, cope with complexity to achieve success.20 The social
value of accountability, when interpreted and implemented as threats
of sanctions against those acts judged after the fact as causal, then
collides with these results on how to achieve high reliability in several
ways.
16. See generally DEKKER, supra note 10; David D. Woods & Richard I. Cook, Mistaking
Error, in THE PATIENT SAFETY HANDBOOK 95 (Barbara J. Youngberg & Martin L. Hatlie eds.,
2004).
17. Critiques of widespread "folk" models of human error can be found in DEKKER, supra
note 7; ERIK HOLLNAGEL, BARRIERS AND ACCIDENT PREVENTION ch. 5 (2004); Woods & Cook,
supra note 16.
18. See generally CHARLES E. BILLINGS, AVIATION AUTOMATION: THE SEARCH FOR A
HUMAN-CENTERED APPROACH (1997); DAVID J. WOODS ET AL., BEHIND COGNITIVE ERROR:
COGNITIVE SYSTEMS, COMPUTERS, AND HINDSIGHT (1994); Gene Rochlin et al., The Self-De-
signing High-Reliability Organization: Aircraft Carrier Flight Operations at Sea, 40 NAVAL WAR
C. REV. 76 (1987).
19. See HOLLNAGEL, supra note 17; Rasmussen, Human Error, supra note 8; Rasmussen, The
Role of Error, supra note 8; Rochlin, supra note 8 (providing general results).
20. For health care specific treatments, see COOK ET AL., supra note 2: Richard I. Cook, Gaps
in the Continuity of Care and Progression on Patient Safety, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 791 (2000); Woods
& Cook, supra note 9; or Emily S. Patterson et al., Gaps and Resilience, in HUMAN ERROR IN
MEDICINE (Marilyn Sue Bogner ed., 2d ed. forthcoming 2005) (on file with author). For a simi-
lar analysis related to surgery, see J. Carthey et al., Institutional Resilience in Healthcare Systems,
10 QUALITY HEALTH CARE 29 (2001).
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A. Blame Blocks Information Flow and Learning
Empirical results of organizations that manage potentially hazard-
ous technical operations successfully are quite surprising. Success was
not related to how these organizations avoided risks or reduced er-
rors.2 1 High-reliability organizations created safety by anticipating
and planning for unexpected events and future surprises. These orga-
nizations did not take past success as a reason for confidence. Instead,
they continued to invest in anticipating the changing potential for fail-
ure because of the deeply held understanding that their knowledge
base was fragile in the face of the hazards inherent in their work and
the changes omnipresent in their environment.22 Safety for these or-
ganizations was not a commodity, but a value that required continuing
reinforcement and investment. The learning activities at the heart of
this process depended on the open flow of information about the
changing potential for failure. High-reliability organizations value
such information flow, use multiple methods to generate this informa-
tion, and then use this information to guide adaptive and constructive
changes without waiting for accidents to occur.2 3
These results mean that mechanisms are needed to help health care
organizations learn about the changing potential paths to failure and
about the changing effectiveness of their failure-sensitive strategies
before injuries occur. However, accountability established through
blame and personal consequences for those closely associated with
cases of failure creates pressure to limit or suppress communication of
information regarding the potential hazards and paths to failure.
The contrast between two parallel and highly visible disasters that
played out in 2003 is particularly instructive. 24 An independent and
highly distinguished technical panel examined the Columbia accident
and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as an
organization. 25 The public, independent process produced a wide-
ranging and detailed set of information on how to improve the organi-
21. See generally Ramussen, Human Error, supra note 8: Ramussen, The Role of Error, supra
note 8; Rochlin, supra note 8.
22. See generally REASON, supra note 8; Weick et al., supra note 8.
23. Experience in aviation safety is widely cited to indicate the power of information about
potential hazards to produce very high levels of success. Several mechanisms exist in aviation to
step outside of normal mechanisms of blame to emphasize learning about systemic vulnerabili-
ties, which create the potential for failure. See, e.g., Billings, supra note 12. Aerospace has also
shown the importance of independent technical investigations in the learning process.
24. Both events occurred in February of 2003 and the struggles to understand and learn from
these tragedies played out in parallel over the next few months.
25. See COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BD., REPORT VOLUME I (Aug. 2003), available
at http://www.caib.us/news/report/pdf/voll/ful/caib-report-volumel.pdf. (analyzing and chang-
ing fundamental aspects of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as an or-
490 [Vol. 54:485
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zation. NASA supported the investigation and is acting on what was
learned despite enduring the burden of criticism and the public dis-
semination of significant deficiencies as an organization. The lessons
are critical for all organizations that manage risky processes. Systemic
changes are widespread and the only question is will these new invest-
ments be sustained over the long term.
During the same time period a seventeen-year-old girl died follow-
ing mistakes in a transplant procedure at the Duke University Hospi-
tal.26 Little is known publicly, with any confidence, about the deeper
systemic and organizational contributors to the accident. Press re-
leases by the hospital itself and press reports provide most of the
available information (as the legal, institutional, and professional re-
sponses that followed the event are largely invisible to the public).27
The comparison of the responses to the two tragedies raises questions
for health care organizations such as: Why was there no deeper inde-
pendent investigation? What systemic responses are needed and how
are these changes monitored over time? Can press releases about an
organization's responses reestablish trust and confidence? 28
Accountability cycles based on blame deflect energy that could be
devoted instead to a search to define who is responsible. This takes
the form of psychological and social processes of causal attribution
such that one of several contributors will be judged as the cause after
the fact.29 The party defined as responsible for that part of the sys-
tems operation will then be seen as a culprit to whom sanctions should
be applied. Evidence of blemishes is gathered to justify that party's
deficiencies. Even simple variations in normal work processes can be
made to look like an ominous early warning sign of internal deficien-
cies in the context of a known failure.
ganization and how it recognizes and handles many risks as opposed to fixating only on the
proximal event).
26. Ralph Snyderman & William Fulkerson, Jessica Santillan Remembered, DUKE MED.
NEWS, Feb. 4, 2004, at http://dukemednews.duke.edu/mediakits/detail.php?id=6498#
remembered.
27. See generally Duke University Medical Center, Background Information on Jessica Santil-
lan Blood Type Mismatch, at http://dukemednews.duke.edu/mediakits/detail.php?id=6498 (last
visited Jan. 25, 2005).
28. The contrast between the two investigations is striking and provides an interesting lead-in
to results on how learning after accidents can break down. See WOODS ET AL., supra note 18, ch.
6.
29. See generally DEKKER, supra note 10; DEKKER, supra note 7: WOODS ET AL., supra note
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B. Distributed Responsibility in Systems of Care
The increasingly interconnected nature of health care produces a
dramatic shift. Today, a patient's course and outcome depends on a
system of care where connections, handovers, cross checks, and infor-
mation exchange takes place between different providers, in different
roles, in different places, and at different times. Smoothly intercon-
necting these different roles and activities to achieve continuity for the
patient is difficult. A consequence of this shift, that is, a joint result of
the disjointed care delivery system, is that it creates the need to con-
sider distributed or collective responsibility. 30
As the health care community learns more about taking a systems
approach to safety issues, we see people troubled and fearful that the
focus on "systems" rather than individuals dilutes responsibility. For
example, a chair of a nursing board expressed frustration with a sys-
tems approach: "What is 'a system'? A system is an inanimate thing
and you can't blame an inanimate thing. I believe a system is created
and perpetuated by people. '31
The irony is that pressure for individual accountability continues
with intensity while processes of organizational and technical change
distribute care increasingly in a larger system of interconnected
parts.32 How do we coordinate and share responsibility in a distrib-
uted system of care?
C. Multiple Contributors to Failure
Research on how complex systems fail reveals the following: (1) ac-
cidents have multiple contributors, each necessary but only jointly suf-
ficient; (2) some of these factors occur prior to the accident and arise
in management or what is termed the blunt end of the organization;
and (3) knowledge of outcome biases assessment regarding the quality
of the processes that contributed to that outcome. 33 The combination
of multiple contributors and hindsight bias creates another difficulty
for attributions of responsibility. Since most responses to accidents
are still based on a single "cause" (or linear chain of causes) view of
how accidents occur, the presence of multiple contributors allows peo-
30. See generally SHARPE & FADEN, supra note 1; Ezekial J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel,
What Is Accountability in Health Care?, 124 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 229 (1996); Larry I.
Palmer, Patient Safety, Risk Reduction and the Law, 36 Hous. L. REV. 1609 (1999); Virginia A.
Sharpe, Accountability and Responsibility in Patient Care, J. MED. & PHIL. 28 (2000).
31. Richard A. Knox, Nurses Fight Back, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 21, 1999, at Al.
32. Dekker looks at the trend to criminalize error. See Dekker, supra note 14.
33. These are described in DEKKER; supra note 10; REASON, supra note 8; and WOODS ET AL.,
supra note 18.
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pie to debate which contributor is the dominant cause and therefore
the person or group who should be held accountable. 34 Consequently,
after the accident we see people or groups jockeying to deflect ac-
countability and consequences onto other contributing factors as the
cause and onto other parties as responsible for those parts of the over-
all system. 35 This process resembles the children's game of musical
chairs as each group jostles to avoid being labeled as "cause" when
the music of post-incident review stops. 36 For example, hindsight bias
makes it easy to downplay organizational contributors and only pur-
sue those people who stood closest to the failure event-nurses, physi-
cians, pilots.
Others will play the attribution of causality process in the other di-
rection. By focusing on the full range of multiple factors that came
together to produce the accident, one can absolve or lessen the conse-
quences for any one party to the adverse event. This creates the pub-
lic impression that none of the relevant parts of the organizations are
being held accountable. Finally, some have used the research results
that point to organizational contributors to an accident to argue for
punishment and stigmatization for the relevant organization as well as
the individual professionals involved at the sharp end of the acci-
dent.37 Despite these difficulties in learning after accidents, in two
significant cases, independent investigation boards have characterized
NASA accidents as organizational failures, analyzed the multiple par-
allel contributors, and recommended broad, major, sustained institu-
tional reforms.38 Failures in complex systems are characterized by
multiple parallel contributors, not single causes. Given that, how can
accountability systems address how multiple contributors come to-
34. See DEKKER, supra note 10; WOODS ET AL., supra note 18, ch. 6; and Nancy G. Leveson, A
New Accident Model for Engineering Safer Systems, 42 SAFETY Sci. 237 (2004).
35. See generally DEKKER, supra note 7.
36. See generally DEKKER, supra note 10; WOODS ET AL., supra note 18.
37. To see these kinds of processes play out, consider the debate over the Colorado nurses
case in which a medication misadministration resulted in the death of a newborn as captured in
John W. Senders, Error, Negligence, Crime: The Denver Nurses Trial, in ENHANCING PATIENT
SAFETY, supra note 11, at 65. Analyses showed many contributors to the misadministration
(wrong dose and wrong route of administration) including the pharmacy and physicians, yet
criminal proceedings were directed at the three nurses who were on hand during the misadminis-
tration. The criminal case involved competing analysis of the role of the multiple contributors.
See also MANOJ S. PATANKAR ET AL., ETHICS IN CASES FROM AVIATION, MEDICINE, AND ENVI-
RONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH (forthcoming 2005) (analyzing the safety dilemmas
in managing health care systems); Dekker, supra note 14 (analyzing criminal cases against pilots
following accidents).
38. See MARS CLIMATE ORBITER MISHAP INVESTIGATION BD., REPORT ON PROJECT MAN-
AGEMENT IN NASAC (Mar. 13, 2000), www.space.com/media/mco-report.pdf [hereinafter MARS
INVESTIGATION BD.]; COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BD., supra note 25.
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gether over time and over different levels of the organization to avoid
a counterproductive, fractionated, and partisan debate over which of
these contributors is the "cause"?
D. Responsibility and Autonomous Computers in Health Care
Among the multiple parties and organizations that may contribute
to the genesis of a patient injury, computers-and the organizations
that design, produce, and maintain them-are becoming more central
in patient care. Computers increasingly have or will have the auton-
omy and authority to make decisions and take actions; computer net-
works allow new forms of delivery and communication, as in
telemedicine. 39 Increasing the scope, authority, and autonomy of
computers in health care changes the nature of practitioners' roles in
the delivery of care.40 How people and computers work together as a
team becomes a new and critical part of achieving success or failure.
Breakdowns in coordination between people and computers are in-
creasingly a major part of the story of accidents in other fields as well
as in some areas of health care. 41 The computer's new role also
changes vulnerability to failure as software reliability becomes an im-
portant contributor to adverse events.42 Unanticipated behavior of
software or unforeseen interactions across software modules have
contributed to numerous failures in aerospace applications. 43
When computers are integral parts of care, how are software engi-
neering and automation design included in reciprocal cycles of ac-
39. See generally Rashid L. Bashshur et al., Telemedicine: A New Health Care Delivery System,
21 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 613 (2000).
40. For further discussion, see the "uncelebrated" cases in COOK ET AL., supra note 2, and
failures such as the one detailed in Graham Brink, Patient Dies in Robot-Aided Surgery, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at lB.
41. For studies of human-automation coordination breakdowns in aviation, see Billings, supra
note 12; and N.B. Sarter et al., Automation Surprises, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN FACTORS AND
ERGONOMICS 1926 (Gavriel Salvendy ed., 1997). For human-automation coordination break-
downs in anesthesiology, see Richard I. Cook et al., Unintentional Delivery of Vasoactive Drugs
with an Electromechanical Infusion Device, 6 J. CARDIOTHORACIC & VASCULAR ANESTHESIA
238 (1992), and Laura Lin et al., Applying Human Factors to the Design of Medical Equipment:
Patient-Controlled Analgesia, 14 J. CLINICAL MONITORING & COMPUTING 253 (1998).
42. See NANCY G. LEVESON, SAFEWARE: SYSTEM SAFETY AND COMPUTERS (1995); and NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP ON SOFTWARE CERTI-
FICATION AND DEPENDABILITY (2004), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309094291/htmlU.
For a broader perspective, see GENE I. ROCHLIN, TRAPPED IN THE NET: THE UNANTICIPATED
CONSEQUENCES OF COMPUTERIZATION (1997).
43. See, e.g., MARS INVESTIGATION BD., supra note 38; Nancy F. Leveson, Systemic Factors in
Software-Related Spacecraft Accidents, 2001 AIAA J. 4763 (2001), available at http://ocw.mit.
edu/ocwWeb/Aeronautics-and-Astronautics/16-355Jadvanced-Software-EngineeringFall2002/
Readings; Toulouse A330 Flight Turned Critical, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Apr. 17,
1995, at 44.
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countability? To date, the dominant cycle is a kind of attribution
game: When the outcome is success (new levels of performance),
software development organizations are quick to tout the software as
the critical ingredient (single factor credit attribution). 44 When the
outcome is failure (new accidents), software development organiza-
tions are quick to say that the system was only optional or a backup
and that erratic people at the sharp end were the critical ingredient in
the adverse event (blame attribution). This pattern is particularly
vivid in the responses to accidents involving the breakdown of coordi-
nation between automation and people. 45
These arguments over attributing cause to people or to automation
serve as a specific example of the process of deflecting consequences
following bad outcomes to those who represent other contributors to
the adverse event. It illustrates how the search for "the" cause blocks
understanding of how complex systems fail through the conjunction of
multiple contributors, that are only jointly sufficient.4 6 Accountability
systems that emphasize sanctions for the individual or group that re-present the "cause" increase the effort devoted to these processes of
attribution after the fact.47 Thus the question remains: How are
software organizations responsible for failures when working with
others in a system of accountability that is distributed across the multi-
ple organizations determining the overall performance and resilience
of health care delivery?
III. POOR SYSTEMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY CREATE OR
EXACERBATE DOUBLE BINDS AND GOAL CONFLICTS
Multiple, simultaneously active goals are the rule, rather than the
exception, for virtually all domains in which expertise is involved.48
Practitioners must cope with the presence of multiple goals: shifting
44. For one list of computer designer/manager rationalizations for why the lessons from acci-
dents do not apply to them, see David D. Woods & Nadine B. Sarter, Learning from Automation
Surprises and "Going Sour" Accidents, in COGNITIVE ENGINEERING IN THE AVIATION DOMAIN
(Nadine B. Sarter & Rene Amalberti eds., 2000). For a specific case of these rationalizations in
health care, see D. John Doyle & Kim J. Vicente, Patient Controlled Analgesia, 164 CANADIAN
MED. Ass'N J. 620 (2001) (and reply by Charles H. McLeskey).
45. See generally COOK ET AL., supra note 2; Lin et al., supra note 41 (for cases involving
infusion devices in health care); LEVESON, supra note 42 (for a review in space operations): and
Woods & Sarter, supra note 44 (for a review in aviation).
46. See WOODS ET AL., supra note 18, ch. 6.
47. One observer of technology defined interface as "an arbitrary line of demarcation set up
in order to apportion the blame for malfunctions." STAN KELLY-BOOTLE, THE COMPUTER CON-
TRADICTIONARY 101 (2d ed. 1995).
48. See generally Richard I. Cook & David D. Woods, Operating at the Sharp End: The Com-
plexity of Human Error, in HUMAN ERROR AND MEDICINE 255 (Marilyn Sue Bogner ed., 1994).
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between them, weighing them, choosing to pursue some rather than
others, abandoning one, and embracing another. Many of the goals
encountered in practice are implicit and unstated. Goals often con-
flict. Sometimes these conflicts are easily resolved in favor of one
goal, sometimes they are not. Sometimes the conflicts are direct and
irreducible, for example when achieving one goal necessarily pre-
cludes achieving another one. But there are also intermediate situa-
tions, where several goals may be partially satisfied simultaneously.
Multiple interacting goals produce tradeoffs and dilemmas. Resolving
these tradeoffs and dilemmas takes place under time pressure and in
the face of uncertainty. While some dilemmas arise from demands
inherent in the process, organizations also constrain and pressure
practice in ways that create or intensify dilemmas. Organizational fac-
tors at the blunt end of systems shape the world in which practitioners
work by influencing the tradeoffs they face and the means available to
resolve dilemmas. Any adequate analysis of a field of practice re-
quires explicit description of the interacting goals, how they contrib-
ute to tradeoffs and dilemmas in particular situations, and the ways in
which practitioners handle them.
How do different systems of accountability exacerbate or help re-
solve goal conflicts and dilemmas? The research results are clear-
when organizations' and industries' system of accountability creates
authority-responsibility double binds, they impose new complexities
and dilemmas that undermine practice at the sharp end.49 Authority-
responsibility double binds occur when one has responsibility and
others will impose sanctions for outcomes, but the responsible party
no longer has sufficient authority to influence or control the processes
that lead to the outcomes.50
For example, in a study by Professional Consultant Larry
Hirschhorn, after the Three Mile Island accident, utility managers
were encouraged by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to develop
detailed and comprehensive work procedures.51 The management at
a particular nuclear power plant instituted a policy of verbatim com-
pliance with all written procedures. 52 This development occurred in a
regulatory climate where absolute adherence to procedures is the
means to achieve safe operations and avoid "human error. '53
49. See, e.g., WOODS ET AL., supra note 18, at 87; Brown, supra note 14.
50. See WOODS ET AL., supra note 18, ch. 4.
51. See generally Hirschhorn, supra note 3.
52. See id. at 139.
53. See id.
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However, for the people at the sharp end of the system who actuallydid things, strictly following the procedures posed great difficulties be-
cause the procedures were inevitably incomplete, sometimes contra-dictory, and novel circumstances arose that were not anticipated in thework procedures. As a result, sometimes success could not be ob-
tained if one only followed the procedure.
When accountability standards demanded strict adherence to proce-dures, the policy created a "double bind." In some situations, if work-ers followed the standard procedures strictly, then the job would notbe accomplished adequately. On the other hand, if they always waitedfor formal permission to deviate from standard procedures, thenthroughput and productivity would be degraded substantially. If theydeviated and it later turned out that there was a problem with whatthey did (for example, they did not adapt adequately), it could create
re-work, safety, or economic problems.4
The double bind arises because the workers are held responsible forthe outcome (the poor job, the lost productivity, or the erroneous ad-aptation); yet they did not have authority for the work practices be-
cause they were expected to comply exactly with the writtenprocedures. As Hirschhorn put it,
These people have a good deal of responsibility. As licensed profes-sionals, they can be personally fined for errors but are uncertain oftheir authority. What freedom of action do they have? What arethey responsible for? This gap between responsibility and authority
means that operators and their supervisors feel accountable forevents and actions they can neither influence nor control.55
In a process of adaptation to organizational pressures, practitioners
respond in one of two basic ways. When one party has responsibility,in that it can experience sanctions based on outcomes, without effec-tive authority to influence the outcome sufficiently, one response is totry to pass responsibility on to others. This is sometimes referred to asa learned helplessness response, as people distance themselves fromboth responsibility and authority.5 6 For example, narrowly following
rules, even when they are inappropriate, is a way workers can reject
responsibility when they do not possess appropriate authority.
54. Authority-responsibility double binds and operator coping strategies also arise in the con-text of autonomous computers given the fundamental brittleness and literal mindedness of algo-
rithms. See WooDs ET AL., supra note 18, ch. 5.
55. See Hirschhorn, supra note 3, at 140. See also Rochlin, supra note 48; Weick et al., supranote 8 (observing that taking responsibility depends on having authority on the processes thatinfluence outcomes).
56. See WOODS ET AL., supra note 18, ch. 4.
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Because practitioners are committed to get the job done in the face
of omnipresent organizational hurdles and other difficulties and gaps,
a second response is more common-development of a covert work
system. Practitioners develop one work system to get the job done
given the inherent demands, tradeoffs, uncertainties, and constraints
imposed while they appear to carry out another work system through
formal documentation and other means to meet the standards for pro-
viding accounts to other stakeholders at the blunt end. of the
organization. 57
Accountability systems can demand that practitioners give accounts
based on adherence to procedures. 58 Since procedures can never be a
complete, consistent, and coherent account of the skills and judgments
required in practice, this creates a gap between the organization's im-
age of technical work and the actual nature of technical work at the
sharp end. Authority-responsibility double binds also exacerbate this
gap. High-reliability, high-resilience organizations work hard to close
this gap, always questioning whether they understand the dilemmas
and tradeoffs faced in sharp end practice.5 9
IV. POOR SYSTEMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY DEGRADE COOPERATION
Health care, like all complex systems, requires coordinated activity
to achieve continuity of care.60 The nature of organizational, eco-
nomic, and technological change in health care increases demand for
effective collaboration to deliver care both safely and efficiently. The
question then becomes how do different relationships in cycles of ac-
countability affect collaborative activity?
In order to carry out joint, interdependent activity, research has
shown that the parties involved enter into a "basic compact," that is,
an agreement (often tacit) to facilitate coordination, work toward
shared goals, and prevent the team's breakdown. 61 One aspect of the
57. Covert work systems also have been explored in Mathilde Bourrier, Constructing Organi-
zational Reliability: The Problem of Embeddedness and Duality, in NUCLEAR SAFETY: A HUMAN
FACTORS PERSPECTIVE 25 (Jyuji Misumi et al. eds., 1999).
58. See generally DEKKER, supra note 7.
59. CooK ET AL., supra note 2; Rochlin, supra note 8; Weick et al., supra note 8; Woods &
Cook, supra note 9.
60. See Emily Patterson et al., Handoff Strategies in Settings with High Consequences for Fail-
ure: Lessons for Health Care Operations, 16 INT'L J. FOR QUALITY HEALTH CARE 125 (2004)
[hereinafter Patterson et al., Handoff Strategies]; Emily Patterson et al., Examining the Complex-
ity Behind a Medication Error: Generic Patterns in Communication, 34 IEEE TRANSACTION ON
SYSTEMS, MAN AND CYBERNETICS, Part A 749 [hereinafter Patterson et al., Examining the Com-
plexity], for an adverse event where coordination broke down.
61. For an overview of how cognitive activity is coordinated and the role of common ground,
see Herbert H. Clark & Susan E. Brennan, Grounding in Communication, in PERSPECTIVES ON
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basic compact is the commitment to some degree of aligning multiple
goals. Typically this entails one or more participants relaxing some
shorter-term, more local goals in order to permit more global and
longer-term goals to be addressed.
Studies of cooperative exchange indicate that the basic compact is a
form of positive reciprocity because overall results on critical goals
like patient safety or continuity of patient care depend on the joint
impact of the actions and decisions of multiple parties over time. As
one researcher described the complex reciprocal dependency,
Person 1 shows "trust" for person 2 by taking an action that gives up
some amount of immediate benefit in return for a longer-run bene-
fit for both, but in doing so person 1 relies on person 2 to "recipro-
cate" in the future by taking an action that gives up some benefit in
order to make both persons better off than they were at the starting
point.62
Accountability systems based on sanctions increase defensiveness
and reduce commitment to this basic compact that underlies coordi-
nated activity. 63 If one party can experience high negative sanctions
depending on outcome, that party is less likely to relax its local goals,
if it exposes the party to risks in being called to account after the out-
come is known. Under threat from the system of accountability, each
party defends their local goals rather than work toward aligning sub-
goals to better achieve more global ends.
A second aspect of the basic compact is that all parties are expected
to bear their portion of the responsibility to establish and sustain com-
mon ground and to repair it as needed.64 Common ground refers to a
process of communicating, testing, updating, tailoring, and repairing
mutual understandings (this is much more than each party having the
same knowledge, data, and goals). 65 Detecting and correcting any loss
of common ground that might disrupt the joint activity requires a sig-
nificant investment of effort to track other groups and connect one's
activities to their activities and needs. The value of the basic compact
is this shared willingness to invest energy and accommodate others,
SOCIALLY SHARED COGNITION 127 (Lauren B. Resnick et al. eds., 1991) (applying lessons of
effective coordination across people to machine agents. For the basic dynamics of cooperation
across multiple agents with goals that do not align automatically, see ROBERT AXELROD, THE
COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION (1997); ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
(1984).
62. Kevin A. McCabe, A Cognitive Theory of Reciprocal Exchange, in TRUST AND RECIPROC-
ITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS FROM EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 148 (Elinor Ostrom &
James Walker eds., 2003) [hereinafter TRUST AND RECIPROCITY].
63. See the cases cited in Brown, supra note 14.
64. See generally Clark & Brennan, supra note 61.
65. Id.
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rather than just performing alone walled off inside one's narrow scope
and sub-goals. In general, achieving coordination requires continuing
investment and renewal as parties to joint activity invest in those
things that promote the compact and counteract those factors that
could degrade it.66 These results raise the danger that accountability
systems based on sanctions reduce the investment of effort in estab-
lishing, maintaining, and repairing common ground and fragment ac-
tivities that should be smoothly interconnected. 67
Trust in coordinated activity occurs when all parties are reasonably
confident that they and others will carry out their responsibilities
within the basic compact. One danger of poor accountability systems
is a breakdown in this form of trust. Factors that risk degrading the
required coordination across the interconnected system of health care
delivery increase risks of adverse events for patients.
V. CULTURE OF BLAME AS A POOR SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY
From the cognitive sciences, the label "culture of blame" points to
some factors that operate in cycles of accountability. In effect, it is a
kind of system of accountability, but represents only one way to de-
sign and manage such systems. Analyzing a "culture of blame" in
terms of the dynamics of this cycle, as described above, reveals many
of the factors that have been implicated in degrading performance,
cooperation, learning, and, therefore, safety.68
Conceptualizing the slogan of "moving beyond a culture of blame"
as a poor system of accountability reveals that the systems approach
does not mean an absence of accountability. It is a necessary part of
our life as social creatures that we may need to explain our actions to
others. The issue is to design and manage those relationships in ways
that advance the common goal of very high levels of safety in a health
care delivery system that also needs to be efficient.
Analyzing and studying cycles of accountability is very difficult be-
cause these results intrude on highly sensitive beliefs about oneself
and others in different social roles. It requires us to consider how our
image of how we call others and are called ourselves to account can be
inconsistent with the actual empirical effects.
66. Id.
67. Elinor Ostrom, Toward a Behavioral Theory Linking Trust, Reciprocity, and Reputation, in
TRUST AND RECIPROCITY, supra note 62, at 1.
68. See generally Patterson et al., Examining the Complexity, supra note 60; Patterson et al.,
Handoff Strategies, supra note 60.
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VI. INNOVATING NEW SYSTEMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY?
Cognitive science ran help stakeholders in health care to step back
and look with fresh eyes at the effects of our systems of accountability.
It helps us see the social dilemmas embedded in individual-focused
(or subunit), culprit-based systems of accountability, such as how the
threat of increased sanctions can undermine cooperative and recipro-
cal trust relationships. Can such analysis, coupled with legal and ethi-
cal scholarship, also help us innovate new possibilities? What system
of "being called upon to give an account" would maximize organiza-
tional learning before patients are injured as a result of care? How
can we move existing embedded attitudes and regulatory, quality as-
surance, civil, and criminal systems toward new targets?
Some things are clear. After the fact analyses need to focus on how
multiple contributors combine rather than isolate one "cause." Ac-
countability systems must encourage constructive and sustained in-
vestment toward systemic change. Enabling and energizing
independent, technical investigations following dramatic cases of pa-
tient injury to produce public accounts is a necessary base step. But in
order to avoid injuries, proactive anticipation of how vulnerability to
failure change is needed. 69 To accomplish this, new studies are
needed to understand how people can be "courageous" in focusing on
safety risks even when such concern sacrifices current production or
economic pressures. 70 Progress needs to be accelerated regarding how
to measure and enhance organizational resilience, so that organiza-
tions can better adapt as changes modify the risk of different vulnera-
bilities to failure and further the effectiveness of planned
countermeasures.
71
In this process of innovating systems of accountability, the conflicts
noted above become a set of testing and measurement criteria. Do
proposed changes enhance the flow of information to learn and antici-
pate vulnerabilities? Do they help connect and share responsibility
across the distributed system of care? Do proposed changes help peo-
ple see how multiple factors and organizational factors combine to
create the conditions for adverse events? Do they connect autono-
mous computers and software engineering into the cycles of accounta-
bility? Do proposed changes reduce double binds and help people
69. See generally Woods & Cook, supra note 9.
70. David D. Woods, Creating Foresight: How Resilience Engineering Can Transform NASA's
Approach to Risky Decision Making (Oct. 29, 2003), http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/woods/news/
woodstestimony.pdf.
71. Kathleen M. Sutcliffe & Timothy J. Vogus, Organizing for Resilience, in POSITIVE ORGA-
NIZATIONAL SCHOLARSHIP 94 (Kim S. Cameron et al. eds., 2003).
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balance and resolve goal conflicts? Do they degrade the required
functions needed for high levels of coordination and interchange?
While analysis of systems of accountability is a difficult and conten-
tious process, the need to discover a different way to achieve simulta-
neously high accountability and high openness to information and
learning is also intense. Poor systems of accountability degrade deci-
sionmaking and safety, as outlined above. New designs of systems of
accountability are needed to help health care organizations anticipate
paths to failure that can arise as capabilities, organizations, and tech-
nologies change, before any patient is injured.
